Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets. Fees to investment banks are correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if banks are being paid for processing information. The more contingent (and, therefore, risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant. Variation in acquisition premia also can be explained by fundamental deal attributes. Contrary to the jaundiced view of fairness opinions, greater fixity of fees is not associated with higher acquisition premia, and there is no evidence that investment banks are suborned by acquirors with whom they have had a prior banking relationship.
Introduction
Investment banking practices recently have become the subject of intensifying scrutiny from regulators and the investment community, each of which has raised questions concerning the efficacy of certain advisory services offered by investment banks -specifically, fairness opinions. This scrutiny largely has been based on anecdotal observations. 1 This article provides empirical evidence germane to those questions. We explain why and how fairness opinions are rendered, and how target companies pay investment banks for this advisory service. We explore potential incentive problems associated with the structure of investment banker fees and other potential conflicts of interest on the part of the investment banker from an empirical perspective. In so doing,
we construct a new database on firm and deal characteristics for friendly, two-step cash acquisitions. Our data measure characteristics of target firms and transactions, fees paid to investment bankers, and premia paid to shareholders of the target company in connection with the acquisition, and explore the connections among these variables to cast light on this neglected area of corporate finance.
We consider empirical implications of the views expressed by both the critics and the defenders of investment banking practices relating to the provision of fairness opinions. We analyze the determinants of investment bank fees and acquisition premia.
We find no evidence in support of the view that the typical investment bank fee structure engenders conflicts of interest detrimental to the target shareholders. Nor do we find any 1 See, e.g, Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2004 summarizing the popular criticisms leveled at fairness opinions and observing that the investment banks that render the fairness opinion are often the advisors who arranged the transaction in the first instance and whose fees depend on the successful consummation of the transaction. See also Bebchuk and Kahan (1989) noting that fairness opinions are "problematic" because investment banks have "substantial discretion in rendering such opinions" and the conflicts of interest faced by the investment bank "lead them to use their discretion to render pro-management fairness opinions."
evidence consistent with the view that bank advisory services to target firms are adversely affected by pre-existing business relationships between bankers and would-be acquirors. Furthermore, our analysis of variation in fees and acquisition premia indicates, among other things, that (1) the variation in fees paid to investment banks by target firms reflects differences in the fundamental costs of valuing targets, and (2) the variation in acquisition premia paid to target shareholders reflects target and transaction characteristics. With respect to the latter, target characteristics include volatility, leverage, and possibly other transaction characteristics that are less significant statistically, including the existence of employment contracts entered into by acquirors to retain target firm management (which are associated with higher acquisition premia). 
What is a fairness opinion? Why and how are they rendered?
When a public company is the target in an acquisition scenario, the target company's board of directors commonly will engage the services of a financial advisorgenerally, an investment bank. In connection with this retention, the board of directors of the target company and the investment bank execute an engagement letter. The engagement letter delineates, among other things, (a) the services the investment bank will provide to the board of directors on behalf of the target company in connection with a proposed transaction and (b) the amount and terms of payment of the fee for such services.
Typically, one of the services offered by an investment bank is an opinion as to the fairness to the target shareholders, from a financial point of view, of the transaction proposed to be undertaken by the target board of directors (a "fairness opinion").
Fairness opinions share several important characteristics. First, the fairness opinion is issued in the form of a letter addressed to the target board of directors and is filed as an exhibit to the relevant Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings made by the target in connection with the proposed transaction. Second, the fairness opinion is dated as of the date it is rendered to the target board of directors (generally the date the target board of directors holds its meeting to vote on the proposed transaction) and speaks only as of such date with no duty (unless the engagement letter specifically provides otherwise) on the part of the investment bank to update ("bring-down") the opinion to a later date. Third, the fairness opinion speaks only to the fairness of the transaction from "a financial point of view" and does not (a) opine that the consideration to be received by the target shareholders in the proposed transaction represents the highest or best price available; (b) address the merits of the transaction or the decision of the board of directors of the target to proceed with the transaction, relative to other possible business strategies; or (c) assume any responsibility for independent verification of the publicly available information respecting the target or the information furnished by the management of the target to the investment bank in connection with its valuation.
Finally, the fairness opinion addressed to the target board of directors expressly states that it does not constitute a recommendation to the target shareholders with respect to the actions necessary to be undertaken by such shareholders for the consummation of the proposed transaction.
Despite the lack of any legal imperative, virtually all boards of directors of public target companies secure fairness opinions before proceeding with a transaction. 141(e)) providing that boards of directors may rely on professional opinions of others assuming such reliance is reasonable, the fairness opinion may serve as evidence that the board of directors has fulfilled its fiduciary duty of care in assessing the financial terms of the proposed transaction.
How do targets pay for fairness opinions?
The fee paid by the target company to the investment bank in connection with a tender offer may be found in Item 5 of the Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule 14D-9 ("Schedule 14D-9") filed by the target with the SEC. The fee to be paid to the investment bank frequently is (a) expressed as a percentage of the overall value of the transaction (defined as the value paid by the acquiror for the equity of the target plus the value of the liabilities assumed) and (b) payable upon the consummation of the transaction (referred to herein as a "Contingent Fee"). In certain instances, the target board of directors may agree to pay the investment bank a fee irrespective of whether the transaction is consummated, which fee would typically represent a small portion of the total fee payable if a transaction were consummated, but may on occasion be the only fee payable to the investment bank. These non-contingent fees may be in the nature of a retainer fee payable either upon execution of the engagement letter or over a period of months during which the investment bank is retained by the target (a "Retainer Fee") or an opinion fee payable when the investment bank is prepared to render a fairness opinion with respect to the proposed transaction (an "Opinion Fee" transactions. The Constant Dollar Fee is a more common fee arrangement for the investment banker to the acquiror inasmuch as, the acquiror may not wish to "reward" its investment banker in the form of a higher cash fee as the purchase price to be paid by the acquiror increases.
Investment banker fees in merger and acquisition transactions are highly negotiable. As we will show in Section 2 below, fee amounts vary considerably. An investment bank may "pitch" its services to the target board of directors based on, among other things, the investment bank's M&A experience both generally and in the target's industry. M&A "league tables" ranking investment banks based on their participation in announced M&A transactions over a given period are often employed for this purpose.
Ultimately, the target board of directors will pay the investment bank based on the target board's perception of the value the investment banker will deliver to the board of the target in connection with the transaction. In determining whether to address this concern from a regulatory perspective, on Second, investment banks bear reputational and legal risks when offering fairness
opinions. An investment bank that routinely opines favorably on an otherwise financially inadequate offer will find it hard to attract future clients, and runs the risk of lawsuits.
Third, an otherwise financially inadequate transaction that collapses under shareholder opposition after the fairness opinion is rendered (generally at the meeting of the board of directors where the board votes on whether to proceed with the proposed transaction) will generate no contingent fees for the investment banker. 
"Testing" the jaundiced and benign views of fairness opinions.
Our empirical analysis does not purport to construct a full-blown structural model of investment banker fees or target acquisition premia. Instead, we perform simple means comparisons and regression analyses to measure whether patterns of association in the data appear to be more consistent with the implications of the benign or the jaundiced views.
We focus on six categories of empirical implications of the benign and jaundiced views of fairness opinions, as set forth below. The remainder of our paper explores these six implications of the benign and jaundiced views, first from the perspective of simple differences in means, and second, from the perspective of regression analyses. Section 2 discusses the construction of our dataset, the definitions of the variables employed in our analysis, and summary statistics.
Section 3 presents our regression findings. Section 4 concludes.
Data

Sample
We examine transactions in excess of $100 million in value, which were announced between 1994 and 2002 and completed, where the consideration was solely cash, and where the acquisition was effected pursuant to a friendly, two-step transaction.
We focus on cash transactions because in such situations the evaluation of the consideration received by the target shareholders is clearly known ex ante. In a cash transaction the target shareholders will not share in any of the "upside" of the ultimate merger as could be argued they would in the case where the target shareholders receive stock of the acquiror.
A friendly, two-step transaction is a transaction approved by the target board of directors pursuant to a first-step tender offer (wherein the acquiror tenders for all, or a number of target shares sufficient for the acquiror to effect a subsequent merger of the target into an acquisition subsidiary of the acquiror, whereby the target becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiror), and a second-step merger between the target and the acquisition subsidiary. We focus on friendly, two-step transactions because that structure generally minimizes the time from announcement to consummation of the transaction.
The greater speed of consummation reflects the fact that the acquiror does not need target shareholder approval for the second-step merger. This feature of friendly, two-step transactions obviates to a great extent the potential concern over the "staleness" of an investment banker's fairness opinion at the time the target shareholders tender their shares pursuant to the offer.
The transactions in the sample were identified based on information set forth in the database of Securities Data Company ("SDC"). To be included in the sample, the transaction needed to satisfy the following criteria:
(1) The transaction was announced between 1994 and 2002 and completed.
(2) The target was a U.S. public company.
(3) The transaction value was in excess of $100 million.
(4) The consideration paid to the target shareholders pursuant to the tender offer consisted solely of cash and the transaction was effectuated pursuant to a friendly twostep deal. For each of the transactions so identified, information on a number of attributes of the transaction was obtained, as described in the 
Summary statistics
We divide the summary statistics into three categories of variables, which are organized by transaction value: (1) information about investment banker fees (IBFEE) and acquisition premia (ACQPREM) are described in Table [ Large firms also tend to show fewer transactions where block shareholders other than officers and directors own large stakes in the firm, a fact that reflects the higher costs of foregoing diversification when holding a substantial share of a large firm. Across most categories of transaction value targets tended to be in industries whose stocks generally performed at least as well as the broader market, with the smallest firms exhibiting the lowest standard deviation. (a) on average, greater fixity in investment banker fees is not associated with higher acquisition premia (contrary to the jaundiced view), and (b) there are interesting patterns of association relating transactions and target characteristics to IBFEE and ACQPREM.
Section 3 explores those patterns of association in the context of simple regression analyses. 4 Fixed_Pct_ExAnte is calculated as the ratio of the fixed part of investment bank's fee relative to the total fee, assuming that the acquisition value equals the pre-acquisition value of the target plus the sample average acquisition premium. Details on the distribution of Fixed_Pct_ExAnte are provided in 
Regression Analysis
In Section 1.4, we developed six testable implications of the benign and jaundiced views. In Section 3, we construct simple regression models of IBFEE and ACQPREM to investigate those implications. Table 3 .1 summarizes the six implications on which we focus. 
Determinants of the Investment Banker Fee (IBFEE)
In constructing a simple model that explains cross-sectional variation in IBFEE, we take into account various proxies for the influences referred to in the first three rows of The definition of the dependent variable in Table [3. 2] is a transformed version of IBFEE, which we label IBFEE_EXANTE. This transformation of IBFEE uses the expected transaction value for the target rather than the actual transaction value in the denominator of the fee percentage calculation. The expected transaction value simply adds the sample average of the acquisition premium (55%) to the pre-acquisition equity value of the target and adds the result to the implied book value of the target debt to arrive at the expected transaction value. This transformation avoids spurious inferences about association between IBFEE and the regressors, which could result from a correlation between the error term in IBFEE (related to unpredictably high premia) and the regressors. As discussed in Section 2, the percentage of fixed fee should be similarly adjusted to avoid spurious correlation; consequently, Fixed_Pct_ExAnte is the regressor used to capture the degree of fixity of fees. We also ran the same regressions as reported in Table [3. 2] without making these two ex ante adjustments and obtained very similar results.
With respect to the first hypothesis in Table [ 3.1], as proxies for information cost specific to the target firm, we included firm asset size (modeled using a quadratic functional form), the volatility of stock price returns, leverage, and whether the target had a prior fee producing relationship with the investment bank. IBFEE should be higher for targets that are small firms, firms with higher returns volatility, highly leveraged firms, and firms that have not had previous contact with the investment bank. PeerBroad is included to capture the effects of hot markets for a particular industry's targets. We anticipated that IBFEE should be lower for target's in industries where the industry is outperforming the broader market.
With respect to the second hypothesis, NoSolicitation is included, and we expect it to enter with a negative sign. That is, when an investment bank's engagement does not entail the solicitation of additional bidders, the fee charged by the investment bank should be lower.
With respect to the third hypothesis, FixedFee_Percent is expected to display a negative coefficient. Note that the variable included in the regression is Fixed_Pct_ExAnte rather than FixedFee_Percent. Fixed_Pct_ExAnte calculates the fixity percentage of the fee based on the expected transaction value rather than the actual transaction value for the target. The rank so assigned for each year was then averaged over the three year period based on the three years prior to the announcement of the transaction. 5 We report five regression specifications in Table [ in Table [ Similarly, leverage and volatility enter positively in the fee regression. Other business between the target and the bank has a negative effect on the fee, as predicted, but this effect is not highly statistically significant (with a significance level of roughly 12 percent). PeerBroad enters negatively, as predicted, and is highly statistically significant.
Consistent with hypothesis two (the benign view), NoSolicitation enters negatively. Consistent with hypothesis three of the benign view, the degree of fixity of the fee is negatively related to the size of the fee, reflecting the compensation received by investment bankers in the form of a higher fee when their fee is riskier (i.e., more contingent).
IBOthBus(Acquiror) is small, negative, and statistically insignificant. IB_Rank is negative and statistically significant. Consistent with our expectation, an investment bank with more transaction experience (a lower rank) in the M&A field is able to command a higher premium for its services, all other factors held constant. Notes: Dependent variable: IBFEE_EXANTE is the ratio of the investment bank's fee relative to the pre-acquisition value of the target plus the sample average acquisition premium.
Determinants of the Acquisition Premium
In constructing a simple model that explains cross-sectional variation in ACQPREM, we take into account various proxies for the influences referred to in the last three rows of Table [ With respect to hypothesis four (benign view) in Table [ 3.1], we include EmpContr to measure the extent to which there is perceived franchise value to the target associated with the acquiror's decision to contract to retain target management.
With respect to hypothesis five, we include Fixed_Pct_ExAnte. According to the jaundiced view, more fixity avoids conflicts of interest, and therefore, should result in higher acquisition premia, all else held constant.
With respect to hypothesis six, IBOthBus(Acquiror) should enter negatively, since according to the jaundiced view, investment banks might be suborned by their contacts with acquirors, resulting in lower acquisition premia for targets.
We also include several other control variables. Controls that were not included in the fee regressions include measures of the concentration of stock ownership, which we thought might be relevant for acquisition premia (since greater concentration might improve the bargaining power of target shareholders). Similarly, we include a dummy variable for the presence of a voting agreement between the acquiror and target shareholders, which should also reflect greater target bargaining power.
With respect to hypothesis four, EmpContr enters positively and is large economically, but it is not highly statistically significant (with a significance level ranging between 12 and 15 percent). The Bonus variable, in contrast, is negative and statistically insignificant. Recall that EmpContr reflects the existence of a contractual agreement between the acquiror and target management, while Bonus reflects a payment from the target to its management in connection with the consummation of the transaction. These results indicate that payments to management, per se, do not affect shareholder value, but that payments to retain management are possibly value-increasing.
This finding provides some support for the view that acquisition premia reflect, in part, the value of intangible assets of target firms. This finding also suggests that target firm shareholders may share in the gains that accrue to target management from preserving value-creating managerial capital.
Neither of the two jaundiced-view hypotheses (five and six) receives support from the regression analysis of ACQPREM. Both the degree of fixity of the investment banker's fee, and the existence of a prior fee-producing business relationship between the acquiror and the target's investment bank, are unrelated to the acquisition premium.
Controls for volatility and leverage both entered positively in the acquisition premium regression. These variables could proxy for many influences (e.g., growth opportunities, more disciplined management) and are not amenable to clear interpretation. Interestingly, while none of the controls for target bargaining power (including the composition of shareholders, and the ShrhAgt variable) prove to be highly statistically significant, ShrhAgt and Non-O/D_w/5% are both positive and sometimes significant at levels of 13 or 14%, and the coefficient on ShrhAgt is large.
ModeSale proved insignificant. Of course, that does not imply that increased competition has no effect on the acquisition premium. Rather, it may be explained by noting that ModeSale is an endogenous variable. The desire on the part of the target to receive multiple bids itself results from an expectation that doing so will improve the outcome, and that improvement will be larger for some firms than for others. That endogeneity may have the effect of reducing the measured effect of ModeSale on the acquisition premium in our regressions; that is, ModeSale may be more likely to be positive when the target's acquisition premium without ModeSale would be particularly low.
Similarly, the fact that IBFEE_Res does not enter significantly in the ACQPREM regression should not be interpreted as evidence that spending more on investment banking services is worthless. IBFEE is a highly endogenous variable. As in the case of ModeSale, its insignificance in the ACQPREM regression can be explained by the supposition that firms with large unexplained investment banking costs have unobservable attributes (i.e., information problems) that encourage them to spend more. 
Conclusion
Our investigation of investment banking fees for fairness opinions and acquisition premia is the first empirical analysis of friendly, two-step, cash acquisitions during our period of which we are aware. Our study is largely descriptive and we do not purport to produce a structural estimation of the determinants of investment banking fees or acquisition premia.
Nevertheless, our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets. Fees to banks are correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if banks are being paid for processing information. The more contingent (and, therefore, risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant. Variation in acquisition premia also can be explained by fundamental deal attributes. For example, acquisition premia are higher when the target's leverage and volatility are higher, and (possibly) when the acquiror contractually seeks to retain target management. Contrary to the jaundiced view of fairness opinions, greater fixity of fees is not associated with higher acquisition premia, and there is no evidence that investment banks are suborned by acquirors with whom they have had a prior banking relationship.
